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After years of negotiations, the Rome Statute was signed on July 17, 1998, creating the International Criminal Court (ICC)—the first permanent world court designed to ad-
dress war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.  The 
General Assembly’s first attempt to negotiate a treaty establish-
ing an international criminal court had come short in 1954, and it 
was not revisited until the end of the Cold War (Lee 2).  In 1992, 
spurred by the International Law Commission, the General As-
sembly decided to re-examine this area of international criminal 
law.  Six years later, the ICC was a reality. 
The Rome Statute grants the Court considerable power and 
independence, and many point to its “trigger mechanisms”—the 
processes within the restructured Court framework that skew the 
adjudication on all international criminal disputes (Ralph 36).  As 
a result of the prosecutor’s capacity to initiate investigations with-
out state approval and his exclusive ability to bring cases for trial, 
the trigger mechanisms within the structural framework of the 
Court appear to leave states with little control over the Court's pri-
mary functions of investigating and prosecuting war criminals.  At 
the outset of negotiations, many powerful states, including all five 
members of the Security Council, were expressly opposed—and 
still are—to trigger mechanisms that grant referral powers to an 
independent actor with such a limited role for states.  Along with 
the diminished voices of signatories in influencing the Court’s ad-
judication process, the trigger mechanisms will likely increase the 
number of investigations at the ICC.  Not only will the number of 
these investigations be in the exclusive domain of the independent 
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prosecutor, the increasing number of investigations will conse-
quently constrain state behavior in new ways to voice opposition to 
the Court’s decisions, particularly among larger and more powerful 
states.
Given the low benefits and high costs signatories of the Rome 
Statue face in bringing cases to the Court—primarily as a result 
of the powers granted to the independent prosecutor—this paper 
seeks to understand the context in which states decide to use the 
embryonic “trigger mechanisms” of the ICC and the pronounce-
ment’s effect on the rapidly evolving norms of international crimi-
nal law. This paper first asks what interest states had in supporting 
these trigger mechanisms, particularly in light of the independent 
prosecutor’s unchecked, powerful mandate of authority in the legal 
process. Second, it inquires how those states articulated and real-
ized their preferences over those of other states. 
overview
No party can refer an individual case to the ICC, but only a 
“situation in which one or more of such crimes [within the jurisdic-
tion of the court] appear to have been committed” (Rome Statute 
Article 13).  Currently, a situation is a general “series of events” in 
which war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide were com-
mitted.1  There are three ways in which a situation may be brought 
before the ICC.  First, any state party to the Rome Statute, or a 
non-state party that has decided to submit temporarily to ICC 
jurisdiction, can refer a situation to the prosecutor.  Second, the 
Security Council can pass a resolution to refer a situation, even one 
that occurred on a territory of a non-signatory.  Third, the pros-
ecutor can independently petition the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) 
for permission to initiate an investigation into a situation without 
state or Security Council approval.  This capacity is unprecedented 
1Article 5.2 of the Rome Statute also provides for the eventual inclusion of aggression. Note 
that Article 17(1)(d) also requires that the crimes be of “sufficient gravity” to fall within 
its jurisdiction: war crimes, for instance, must be “widespread and systematic,” and crimes 
against humanity must be “part of a plan or policy, or part of a large-scale commission.”
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in international courts and is often cited as the most revolutionary 
aspect of the Rome Statute (Olásolo 39; e.g. Ralph 36).
The prosecutor must inform any interested state of an in-
vestigation he commences, unless it was initiated by the Security 
Council (Rome Statute Article 18.1).  An “interested state” is any 
state that might normally have a claim to prosecute the crimes in 
question (Hall 1998a 131).  If any such state wishes to take over 
the investigation, “the prosecutor shall defer to the state’s investiga-
tion” (Rome Statute Article 18.2).  This principle, known as “com-
plementarity,” essentially preserves states’ rights to investigate and 
prosecute crimes domestically if they wish.  The prosecutor may 
appeal a state’s request to take over an investigation to the PTC.  If 
the PTC determines the state is “unwilling or unable genuinely” to 
take over the investigation, the state must return its investigation to 
the prosecutor.  Crucially, it is the ICC that makes this determina-
tion, not the interested state (Rome Statute Article 17).
It is also important to note that the constraints on the pros-
ecutor’s power are all negative constraints.  The Security Council 
may defer an investigation already begun by the prosecutor under 
Article 16, or an interested state may defer an investigation under 
Article 18, but the prosecutor does not need either actor’s positive 
consent in order to commence an investigation.  However, having 
conducted an investigation into a situation, the prosecutor has the 
exclusive power to bring individual cases to trial at the Trial Cham-
ber, although states or the Security Council may request the PTC 
to review the prosecutor’s decisions. 
Secondary Functions of the Trigger Mechanisms
The trigger mechanisms as formulated are likely to have two 
important consequences.   First, as a result of having an indepen-
dent prosecutor, there are likely to be more war crimes trials.  The 
rules allowing the prosecutor to initiate an investigation without the 
prior approval of states or the Security Council suggest the number 
of investigations will increase; other international courts that allow 
non-state actors to refer cases, such as the European Court of Hu-
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man Rights (ECHR), have seen similarly high incidences of trials 
(Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 475). 
Second, even if those investigations are taken over by states 
under the complementarity principle, there is the possibility under 
Article 17 that the ICC may determine a state to be “unable or un-
willing genuinely” to investigate or prosecute war crimes, making 
complementarity conditional.  Conditional complementarity will 
likely put pressure on states to conduct trials at certain standards 
of transparency, efficiency, and fairness.  This will occur primar-
ily through legal precedents in determining inability and unwill-
ingness to bring the accused to justice.  As Dempsey argues, “that 
constitutes an unprecedented challenge in the sources of national 
lawmaking, one that diminishes the traditional notion of state sov-
ereignty” (Dempsey 52).
why DiD states vote for the triGGer meChanisms?
Primary Proponents: the Like-Minded Group
The first countries to propose an independent prosecutor 
were Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland in early 1994 (Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission 24, 46).  By August 1995, several others 
states, such as Greece, Austria, and the Netherlands, advocated for 
an Independent prosecutor as well (Glasius 2002 153).  Australia, 
Canada, Egypt, Germany, Ghana, and Italy joined shortly thereaf-
ter. 
These states formed the Like-Minded Group (LMG), which 
was to grow substantially in later years.  Throughout its existence, 
the LMG was an informal coalition.  No full-scale historical study 
of the LMG has been conducted, so its precise origins and mem-
bership are hard to trace.  By the end of 1996, however, many states 
had actively declared their membership in the LMG, and it grew 
to include over 40 states.  By the time of the Rome Conference in 
1998, this number had increased to over 75, including the United 
Kingdom and many smaller states, such as Benin and the Solomon 
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Islands (Schabas 16, Bassiouni 1999a 31).  Throughout negotia-
tions, it was this group that advocated most forcefully for the in-
dependent prosecutor and a reduced role for the Security Council. 
Therefore, one must look to the LMG in order to understand the 
origins of state interest in the ICC’s trigger mechanisms. 
The Trigger Mechanisms as a Result of Power and Coercion
Under a realist interpretation, one would expect that power-
ful states dictated to smaller states which trigger mechanisms to 
include in the Rome Statute (Goldstein et al. 385-399).  Rudolph 
argues that war crimes tribunals, and the rules governing them, are 
controlled by powerful states (Rudolph 2001).  Realists hold in-
ternational law to be epiphenomenal, which means that it will not 
encroach significantly on the interest of states, especially powerful 
states (Abbott 365).  Despite this, the preferences of the Great Pow-
ers—the permanent five of the Security Council—are not reflected 
in the trigger mechanisms as formulated in the Rome Statute. 
From the outset of the negotiations, these states argued that 
only the Security Council should have referral rights.2  This ar-
gument failed to hold sway.  They also proposed that individual 
members of the Security Council should have the right to veto any 
investigation, but this was overturned with the so-called “Singa-
pore Compromise.”3  Most importantly, these states were firmly 
2 Members argued that “the primary purpose in establishing a permanent international 
criminal court was to avoid the necessity of the Security Council establishing ad hoc 
tribunals to deal with crimes under international humanitarian law.” Under this system, as 
with the Ad Hoc Tribunals in Rwanda and Yugsolavia, the Security Council alone could 
control which investigations were started and which were not. However the ICC would 
obviate the need to establish a new tribunal each time a situation arose (Summary Record 
of the 27th Meeting).  
3During the preparatory meetings prior to the Rome Conference, there was a strong divide 
between those states that argued the Security Council must pre-authorize any investigation 
by the ICC, and those that felt it should have no referral powers at all. Singapore made 
a proposal, subsequently known as the ‘Singapore Compromise,’ whereby the Security 
Council would have the right to defer an investigation. Any trial commenced would go 
ahead unless the Security Council’s members collectively agree that an investigation should 
be stopped, and passed a resolution to that effect. This subtle difference in effect retains the 
Security Council’s collective right to control investigations at the ICC, but it does not give 
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opposed to the prosecutor's power to initiate investigations inde-
pendently (Glasius 2006, 52).  On a similar note, the great powers 
also believed the ICC should have no rights to determine if a state 
is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute war crimes. 
Though the wishes of powerful states were not fully realized 
in the Rome Statue, power-based theories are not completely at 
a loss to explain the ICC's trigger mechanisms.  For instance, the 
preferences of middle powers were accepted over the preferences of 
smaller states.  It is certainly possible that this may be a result of 
aid-based coercion: 19 out of 22 of the world’s largest aid donors 
were middle powers that supported the independent prosecutor 
and the reduced role of the Security Council at the time of the 
Rome Statute's passing (OECD Fact Sheet).4   Nonetheless, this 
does not explain why Great Powers, with the most influence and 
money, lost the support of many small states to the middle pow-
ers.
Trigger Mechanisms Reflecting State Interest
If great power preference does not account for the trigger 
mechanisms in the Rome Statute, can they then be explained by 
state interest?  After all, 83 percent of states at Rome supported the 
independent prosecutor by the end of the Rome Conference, and 
86 percent of states voted for the Rome Statute overall on July 17, 
1998 (Glasius 2006, 59).  One possible explanation is institutional-
ist, which sees state interest as exogenously constructed. In such a 
framework, the ICC would have been created to fulfill a particular 
function.5   Here, interest is analyzed purely at the international 
level without consideration of domestic politics, individual leaders, 
interest groups, or norms.  Under an institutionalist framework, it 
is not immediately evident why states, especially the primary pro-
any individual Security Council member the right to veto an investigation.
4An important caveat is that while nineteen out of twenty-two seems an impressive 
number, the three states unaccounted for are the first, second, and third highest aid donors 
respectively (the US, Japan, and France), all of whom opposed the independent prosecutor 
at Rome. Their collective aid outweighs the combined aid of the remaining nineteen.
5See Abbott & Snidal, 421-456; Keohane et al., 457-488; and Koremenos et al., 1-40.
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ponents of the ICC and its independent prosecutor, would have an 
exogenous interest in the trigger mechanisms.  In thinking through 
this issue, a cost-benefit analysis proves a useful analytical method 
to see what advantages or disadvantages might come as a result of 
the ICC's trigger mechanisms. 
Costs
 For many states, it is unlikely that the independent pros-
ecutor will come as a sovereignty cost. As it is typically defined, a 
sovereignty cost can best be understood as “the symbolic and ma-
terial costs of diminished national autonomy,” including “the po-
tential for inferior outcomes, loss of authority, and diminution of 
sovereignty” (Abbott 375; Abbott and Snidal 437).  These costs are 
“at their highest when international arrangements impinge on the 
relations between a state and its citizens or territory” (Abbott and 
Snidal 437).  Complementarity, which allows states to take over in-
vestigations that the prosecutor may initiate, will reduce sovereign-
ty costs substantially, since a state will retain its authority to regu-
late its citizens’ behavior through its own judicial system.  In 1951 
and 1953, the International Law Commission's draft statues for an 
international court did not include the principle of complementar-
ity, and each of these drafts were roundly rejected (Bassiouni 1997, 
14). Such an example helps to illustrate states' chief concern with 
maintaining a level of sovereignty through complementarity.  
However, complementarity is conditional, and not all states 
will be as well-protected by it as others.  Many developing states 
might incur higher sovereignty costs than established powers.  De-
veloping states that are either engaged in or emerging from conflict 
should reasonably be expected to face a greater incidence of “situ-
ations” than developed, stable states.  The more situations that oc-
cur, the more likely the state is to be investigated by the ICC.   On 
top of this, the ICC's ability to determine that a state is “unable or 
unwilling genuinely” to investigate or prosecute war criminals will 
further increase the sovereignty costs.  As William Schabas argues, 
many developing states do not have established and recognized ju-
124 De Swardt  •  Trigger Mechanisms
dicial systems that the ICC would necessarily deem “able and will-
ing genuinely” to bring defendants to justice (Schabas 2004 86). 
For small, developing states, then, an independent prosecutor pres-
ents unique sovereignty costs. 
Great powers also incur sovereignty costs as a result of the 
ICC’s independent prosecutor. More often than their smaller peers, 
their foreign policies may entail military presence overseas; indeed, 
many of the Security Council members have recently conducted 
or are conducting military operations on foreign territory—most 
obviously, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States, 
United Kingdom, and other NATO powers.  Consequently, their 
potential for involvement in war crimes situations is higher, and an 
independent prosecutor invites the possibility of sovereignty costs. 
Nonetheless, complementarity would likely lower such costs for 
these powers.  The ICC is not likely to determine that they are un-
able or unwilling to prosecute war crimes: “the difficulties involved 
in challenging a State with a sophisticated and functioning justice 
system would be virtually insurmountable,” according to Louise 
Arbour, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (qtd. in Schabas 2004, 86). 
In contrast to the small and large states, middle powers seem 
to face few of these sovereignty costs. These very middle pow-
ers—states such as Canada, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Finland and Argentina—came together first to form the 
LMG and to vocalize support for the ICC's independent prosecu-
tor. For such states, uncertainty about potential war crimes vio-
lations is comparatively slight given their limited involvement in 
foreign military operations. As with the great powers, though, it 
is difficult to imagine the ICC considering their judicial system as 
ineffective.  Thus, they have little reason to fear a challenge to their 
judicial system by the independent prosecutor or the ICC.  In a 
cost-benefit calculation, their costs are lowest of all states. 
Benefits
From the outset, state benefits from the ICC trigger mecha-
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nisms are not immediately clear; however, the secondary effects of 
an independent prosecutor help to elucidate these state interests. 
One rational choice motivation for state interest may be that an in-
dependent prosecutor would reduce future threats to global peace 
and security.  Though there is very little evidence either that pros-
ecution regularly deters future war criminals or that prosecution is 
correlated with an end to violence in war crimes situations, states 
may nonetheless have perceived that the ICC’s independent pros-
ecutor would contribute towards global peace and stability (Dietel-
hoff 10).  In fact, the Rome Statute’s negotiating records suggest 
states believed the ICC would achieve this goal.  Nevertheless, 
whether this actually constitutes a “benefit” that would be in the 
self-interest of states depends on the state.  For small states, global 
peace and security might be a means of ensuring their own survival, 
reducing internal instability, or aiding economic growth.  On the 
other hand, the core proponents of the ICC, the already stable and 
prosperous middle powers, were considerably less likely to benefit 
from global peace and security than small states; achieving such 
ideals will not likely increase the chances of their survival or, for 
instance, increase economic productivity.
Another potential gain from signing and ratifying the Rome 
Statute may be what Abbott and Snidal identify as the “reputational 
benefits” of international law (427).  The authors argue that states 
have an interest in “hard” law because it creates useful credibility 
and reputational benefits for compliant states. First, commitments 
to one area of international law lend credibility to a state’s com-
mitments in all areas of international law, and such commitments 
may be beneficial to smaller states’ chances of receiving foreign aid. 
However, neither of these potential benefits would apply to the 
core proponents of the ICC, who were primarily aid donors, not 
aid recipients, and whose commitments to international law were 
already credible at the time of ICC negotiations. It is not incorrect 
to say supporting the ICC and the independent prosecutor had 
useful reputational benefits, but it is important to realize that these 
benefits extended mostly to the small states—states that were sec-
ondary supporters of the ICC. 
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Finally, if we assume that the core supporters of the ICC 
(i.e., the LMG) hoped to reduce war crimes and to establish global 
peace, then, an institutionalist argument could be made that having 
an independent prosecutor would concretely “lock in” or cement 
that interest.  In other words, the LMG sought to create an in-
dependent prosecutor as a means to an end—reductions in war 
crimes and global peace.  Indeed, the negotiating records of the 
Rome Statute indicate that the LMG aggressively advocated for an 
independent prosecutor for precisely this reason.  In as much as 
this is an institutionalist argument, it is a weak one.  While it is 
true that having an independent prosecutor would lock in middle 
power preference, it is unclear how these preferences—reductions 
in war crimes and global peace—would constitute a “benefit” or be 
in the rational self-interest to these particular states.  There is a 
further caveat to the “locking in” argument.  As already noted, 83 
percent of states eventually supported the independent prosecutor, 
with 86 percent supporting the ICC generally.  If the LMG had 
strong-armed consensus on the independent prosecutor against 
the will of other states, then we might expect a larger discrepancy 
between these two figures.   Thus it seems the primary proponents 
of the independent prosecutor—that is, middle powers—had both 
little to gain and little to lose from the trigger mechanisms of the 
ICC.  At the same time, the low costs clearly are important to un-
derstanding why these states supported them.
Cost-benefit Analysis of the ICC’s Trigger Mechanisms.
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Liberal Theories
So far, state interest has been assumed as exogenously given, 
and it has not been analyzed at the domestic and decision-maker 
level, as liberal theories do.  Although liberal theories remain a ra-
tional choice analysis, they are applied to states as well as non-state 
actors, such as domestic political parties, special interest groups 
and NGOs, or individual leaders. 
Andrew Moravcsik, in his widely-cited article, “The Origins 
of Human Rights Regimes,” argues that human rights regimes 
can only be explained by looking at “the domestic self-interest of 
national governments” (Moravcsik 220).  Using the ECHR as a 
model, Moravcsik contends, “the primary proponents of binding 
international human rights commitments in postwar Europe were 
neither great powers, as realist theory would have it, nor govern-
ments and transnational groups based in long-established democ-
racies, as the ideational account would have it.” (Moravcsik, 219).6 
Rather, Moravcsik argues that the historical record indicates new 
governments in recently emerging democracies were the states most 
active in advocating for the ECHR. 
Liberal republicanism, which contends that newly-formed 
democratic governments attempt to “lock-in” domestic commit-
ments to the rule of law, democracy, and human rights through in-
ternational law, may offer a compelling explanation for the origins 
of the ECHR and its trigger mechanisms, but evidence for this the-
ory in the case of the ICC’s trigger mechanisms is not overwhelm-
ing, despite the same surprising conclusion that powerful states did 
not support high levels of access to the ICC, let alone coerce other 
states into supporting them.  
The “primary proponents” of the ICC were the LMG, of 
which some states—about fifteen in total—were indeed emerg-
ing democracies at the time of the Rome Conference.7  States that 
6 Ideational theory, according to Moravcsik, argues that “Governments accept binding 
international human rights norms because they are swayed by the overpowering ideological 
and nonnative appeal of the values that underlie them.” (Moravcsik 223).
7 This number was derived from the Freedom House country rankings. Freedom House, 
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were either “Not Free” or “Partly Free” but that had become “Free” 
within ten years prior to 1998 included nine Central and Eastern 
European countries,8  as well as countries such as South Africa, 
Chile, and Venezuela.  Though many supporters of the ICC were 
emerging democracies, Moravcsik's theory does not apply for two 
reasons.  The first is that all of these emerging democracies only 
joined the group later and were thus all secondary proponents of 
the independent prosecutor. The second is that they did not neces-
sarily vote for the Rome Statute to lock in domestic policy goals as 
Moravcsik would predict. In the case of the ECHR, Moravcsik’s 
evidence for his conclusions—that emerging democracies were 
the primary proponents of the ECHR, and that they were moti-
vated by domestic policy preferences—is primarily derived from 
speeches, negotiation records, and European Parliamentary records 
(Moravcsik 237). But in the case of the ICC, the analogous evi-
dence9 offers surprisingly little to suggest that emerging democra-
cies were notably active in the LMG, or that they were vocal in their 
support out of domestic political interest.
Normative Values
At this point, it becomes clear that the preferences of the core 
proponents of the ICC and its high-access trigger mechanisms (i.e. 
the LMG) did not find their origin in power or self-interest. Nei-
ther institutionalist nor liberal arguments can account for the fun-
damental origin of state interest in the ICC’s trigger mechanisms, 
although they may reveal the rational choice strategies by which 
that interest was locked in. While some states may have supported 
the independent prosecutor as a means to cement their preferences, 
these preferences constitute values, or norms, more than they rep-
Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-2006. 
8Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Romania.
9The records of the ICC’s development, including the records of the International Law 
Commission, the Sixth Committee (the committee in the General Assembly that discusses 
international law), the Ad Hoc Committee, PrepCom meetings, and the Rome Conference 
itself.
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resent self-interest. 
I argue, then, that to understand why the primary proponents 
of the ICC’s trigger mechanisms supported high levels of access 
to the Court, one must look to norms, values and principles. The 
LMG was initially a coalition of middle powers who shared a set 
of norms and preferences about the Court, including the indepen-
dence of the prosecutor. Indeed the independent prosecutor was 
one of four key “cornerstones” of the LMG’s policy preferences 
(Glasius, 2006, 23).  Though the LMG is defined principally by 
the states that it comprises, it is important to note that the LMG 
initially formed around a group of individual delegates to the Sixth 
Committee—the committee in the General Assembly that deals 
with international law (Glasius, 2006, 22).  It may seem obvious, 
but the LMG’s preferences were articulated by individual deci-
sion-makers, not states.  For the most part lawyers by profession 
rather than practicing diplomats, these delegates may have been 
more concerned with the legal functionality of the Court than with 
representing “state interest” as defined in any of the rational choice 
theories discussed above.  In some cases, these lawyers came from 
states that did not favor the establishment of the ICC and have yet 
to sign or ratify the Statute.10  That the LMG formed around such 
delegates explains more clearly why state interest is highly obfus-
cated in the trigger mechanisms. 
Moreover, in their speeches and debates at the Sixth Com-
mittee, delegates consistently underscored normative values in ex-
plaining their support for the ICC as well as their advocacy for the 
independent prosecutor, the reduced role of the Security Council, 
and the situation/case distinction.  They argued that without these 
three elements incorporated into the statute, the ICC would be be-
holden to state control and political interference and would have 
no capacity to act where it was most needed.  Indeed the likeli-
hood of more trials as a result of the independent prosecutor and 
of trials conducted at certain standards of impartiality, transpar-
ency, and efficiency, as determined by the ICC, strongly informed 
10 For instance, M. Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt, S. Rama Rao of India, and Lionel Yee of 
Singapore.
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and influenced the LMG’s preferences. LMG states stressed the 
importance of values such as legitimacy, global justice, the rule of 
law, non-politicized and impartial trials, global peace and security, 
assisting war crimes victims, avoiding “victors’ justice” or violations 
of the principle nulla crimen sine lege,  and the moral obligation to 
end human suffering.11 
DeveloPment of norms 
While it seems clear that those states who advocated most 
forcefully for the independent prosecutor did so primarily as a re-
sult of normative preferences, we still do not know why their prefer-
ences were realized in the Rome Statute while those of other states 
were not.  Although 83 percent of states ultimately supported the 
independent prosecutor, not all states shared this preference to be-
gin with. Indeed, those who did in December of 1996 amounted to 
only 23 percent (Dietelhoff 17). 
The mass atrocities witnessed in both Yugoslavia and Rwan-
da were one of the most important factors underlying why states 
adopted such a position.  Prior to 1993, the main reasons behind 
state efforts to create the ICC had been instrumental (e.g., to pre-
vent and try drugs crimes).  While the International Law Com-
mission had expanded the Court’s mandate to include war crimes, 
it was not a state-led effort. It was only after the creation of the 
ICTY that many states came to see the importance of such a man-
date.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
lent the process further urgency.  Those in favor of the independent 
prosecutor repeatedly and energetically invoked these incidences of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide as evidence of the necessity of this 
trigger mechanism.  They argued in meetings that the brutal na-
ture of the conflicts and the scale of deaths were unconscionable; 
states had a moral obligation to prevent further conflict, and one 
way to realize this objective was to have an independent prosecutor 
11 For examples of states espousing these values, the meeting records of the Rome 
Conference are particularly helpful. See Summary Records of the Committee as a Whole, 
contained in UN Doc. A/CONF/13 (Vol. II).
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(Kirsch and Oosterveld 1141-60).  From a legal perspective, the 
two tribunals also constituted evidence of a “growing consensus or 
international norm concerning the institutionalization of humani-
tarian law” (Leonard 36).
One must also look to the role of domestic politics to un-
derstand how these norms developed.  First, the change in admin-
istration in 1993 in the United States had a clear impact on the 
United States’ statements and policy preferences.  An examina-
tion of the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee meeting records 
clearly shows a shift in attitude between 1992 and 1993. Under 
the Bush administration in 1992, the United States' Sixth Com-
mittee members consistently argued for a total moratorium on 
the International Law Commission’s work on the ICC.  Under the 
Clinton administration in 1993, they viewed the work as “excellent, 
thoughtful, serious and deserving of attention by member states” 
(Morris and Bourloyannis 350). 
More direct evidence of domestic politics impacting norms 
comes from the United Kingdom.  The change from a Conservative 
to Labour government is cited by numerous sources to have been 
highly influential on negotiations (e.g. Hall 1998a, 132). This oc-
curred in mid-1997, just over a year before the Rome Conference. 
In that time, the United Kingdom changed positions dramatically, 
withdrawing its previous opposition to the independent prosecu-
tor (Hall 1998a, 132).  It also accepted a reduced role for the Se-
curity Council under the Singapore Compromise and did not op-
pose the judicial review powers granted to the ICC in its trigger 
mechanisms.  Because this massive change came from a member of 
the Permanent Five, it crucially undercut the unity of the Security 
Council in its opposition to the independent prosecutor.  U.K. sup-
port for the independent prosecutor lent increased momentum to 
the LMG and the NGO coalition.  While the United States and 
the United Kingdom were far from the core proponents of the ICC 
or its trigger mechanisms, changes in their governments did create 
the conditions under which the LMG could succeed in advancing 
its normative preferences. 
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The “New Diplomacy”
A new body of scholarship argues that one must look at a 
process known as the “New Diplomacy,”12  a method of negotiat-
ing international treaties that is a “bold break from traditional pro-
cesses [by using] innovative methodology and…amazing speed” 
(Davenport 18).  It consists of coalition building with non-state 
actors, agenda control, accelerating negotiations to force results, 
wide-ranging lobbying efforts, occasional policy-making for small 
states, a break from consensus politics, and a tendency for its pro-
ponents to implement “take it or leave it” package deals. 
Coalition Building
One of the principle factors in the success of the LMG was its 
tactic of coalition building.  Both Glasius and Leonard study this 
coalition extensively (Glasius, 2006; Leonard).  They assert that 
one must look to the role of persuasion and discourse to grasp why 
small states accepted LMG proposals for the ICC trigger mecha-
nisms.  In this endeavor, the LMG was supported and goaded by 
a vast array of NGOs—over eight hundred in total—under the 
umbrella of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
(CICC).  Almost all accounts of the ICC’s history stress the impor-
tance of NGOs to negotiations (e.g., Kirsch and Holmes, Bassiou-
ni 1999a, Bassiouni 1999b, Glasius, Benedetti and Washburn, and 
Arsanjani). 
With regard to the prosecutor, NGOs performed two major 
functions.  Firstly, they persuaded wavering states that the posi-
tion was both desirable and achievable (Glasius 2002, 60).  NGOs 
pressured unsure states to support high access levels on normative 
as well as functional grounds.  They argued that having an inde-
pendent prosecutor and curtailed Security Council powers, in both 
referral and deferral, were essential to the successful administration 
of justice.  Indeed, the likelihood of more trials and fairer trials, 
discussed above, factored strongly into their support for the trig-
12See Davenport, Dietelhoff, and Cooper, English & Ramesh.
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ger mechanisms as formulated (see, for instance, Report of the Ad-
Hoc Committee, par. 113).  In making these normative arguments, 
NGOs used governments’ own statements against them to push 
them into compliance:
Governments had made a lot of statements of the Yugoslavi-
an and Rwanda Tribunals about international justice. Those 
governments really made very strong statements but of course 
in a different context. And it was very easy to use those state-
ments against them to push them further (C.K Hall qtd. in 
Dietelhoff 26).
The coalition was further strengthened by the support of the 
prosecutors for the ICTY and ICTR.  The former made impor-
tant appeals for an independent prosecutor at the fifth meeting of 
the Preparatory Committee in December 1997 (Hall 1998b, 339). 
There it was stressed that the prosecutor needed the power to ini-
tiate investigations propio motu in order to avoid politically mo-
tivated trials.  Additionally, both prosecutors attended the Rome 
Conference as independent experts.  There, they made an impor-
tant impact on delegations, arguing that the independence of the 
prosecutor would be necessary for the effective functioning of the 
court (Glasius 2006, 11). 
Secondly, the CICC also played an important function in 
convincing states of the feasibility of an independent prosecutor. 
Glasius argues that many small states did not support the indepen-
dent prosecutor simply because they believed such a position would 
never be realized in the face of U.S. opposition (Glasius 2006, 56-
60).  To that end, the CICC circulated a daily newsletter at Rome 
that demonstrated where each state stood on controversial matters. 
By showing in hard numbers that many states were not opposed to 
an independent prosecutor, even if they had not directly supported 
it, they were able to demonstrate that the United States, while vo-
cal in its opposition, was not necessarily in the majority (Glasius 
2006, 59).  The focus shifted from powerful states to the number of 
states, as each had only had one vote. Phillip Kirsch, the chairman 
of the conference, concluded that the independence of the prosecu-
tor was one of “the features that might not have appeared without 
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the concerted NGO insistence” (qtd. in Glasius 2006, 57).
Leadership and Agenda Control
A further reason the LMG-led coalition was successful lay 
in its ability to gain and hold key leadership positions throughout 
the negotiation process.  First, this meant that it could control the 
“rules of the game” as the Statute developed, and, second, that it 
could directly influence critical decisions at key moments. 
The Ad Hoc Committee, the first committee in which states 
were to debate directly the draft statute, was chaired by Adriaan Bos, 
the Netherlands’ delegate to the Sixth Committee.  He also chaired 
the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings—six meetings 
of state representatives, and in some cases NGOs, convened to pre-
pare a draft statute in advance of the Rome Conference.  Bos made 
several tactical decisions that strongly changed the rules of the 
game in the LMG’s favor.  He divided the agenda up into working 
groups that were chaired by delegates from LMG countries (Gla-
sius 2002, 44).  The working groups on trigger mechanisms in both 
the Ad Hoc and Preparatory Committees were chaired by Silvia 
Fernández de Gurmendi, a founding LMG member from Argen-
tina.  Another crucial victory was the attendance of NGOs at all 
of these meetings and at the Rome Conference itself (Benedetti & 
Washburn 23).
Bos also scheduled several informal meetings outside of the 
Ad Hoc and PrepCom meetings.  In some cases, critical aspects of 
the draft statute were negotiated at these meetings—a prime ex-
ample being the power of the ICC to take over investigations if it 
determines a state is unable or unwilling to do so (“Decisions Tak-
en By The Preparatory Committee” 10).  Likewise, non-substan-
tive but nonetheless necessary administrative work was conducted 
at these informal meetings.13  Not all states were invited to these 
13 For instance, after the fifth PrepCom there was no single, consolidated draft statute. 
Many substantive changes had been made to the ILC draft statute, but they had yet been 
merged into a unified, coherent document. Bos organized an informal meeting of states 
and NGOs at Zutphen in January 1998, where he drafted a consolidated text, known as 
the “Zutphen Draft.”
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meetings, yet NGOs were (Benedetti and Washburn 11).  Indeed, 
when one such meeting, the Courmayeur Meeting, lacked the nec-
essary funding to go ahead, an NGO covered the costs (Bassiouni 
1999b, 447).
Perhaps Bos’s most important contribution was to argue that 
the ICC should be established by multilateral treaty.  As Chairman 
of the Ad Hoc Committee and PrepCom Committee, he presented 
this view to the Sixth Committee multiple times as if it were a given 
that all states agreed with him (see, for instance, Summary Record 
of the 25th Meeting, par. 26).  In fact, many did not.  The LMG 
preferred a multilateral treaty because it gave equal voting power to 
all states.  Against this view, the great powers had argued the ICC 
should be established by Security Council resolution, as had been 
the case with the ICTY and ICTR.  
Bos's ability to dictate the rules of the game, so to speak, was 
further enhanced by his nomination to chair the Rome Confer-
ence as well.  However, he fell ill a few weeks before it started and 
was subsequently unable to fulfill this role.  In his place, he recom-
mended the Canadian lawyer Philip Kirsch.  At this point, Canada 
was the chair of the LMG, and Kirsch, together with the rest of 
the leadership of the conference (again, all from LMG states) still 
maintained substantial influence over the outcome by drawing 
up the agenda for the conference in advance at a meeting funded 
by NGOs (Bassiouni 1999b, 446-447).  Kirsch scheduled trig-
ger mechanisms and the independent prosecutor to be discussed 
amongst the last items on the agenda.  He also ensured that trigger 
mechanisms were debated not in a working group, but in the Com-
mittee as a whole, which he chaired himself.  
 Kirsch also made other crucial decisions that prevented states 
who did not share his preferences on trigger mechanisms and other 
matters from wielding too much influence.  He limited the time for 
speechmaking, worrying that powerful states opposing the Court 
might obfuscate and delay the progress of the statute if given the 
chance (Benedetti and Washburn 28).  More crucially, about three 
weeks into the Rome Conference, when it became clear that states 
were locked into entrenched positions on trigger mechanisms, ju-
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risdiction, and other controversial aspects of the Statute, Kirsch 
organized a meeting at the Canadian Embassy, inviting only LMG 
states and the CICC.  At this meeting, he drafted a “Bureau Paper” 
that purportedly represented an aggregate of state views on the 
Statute’s most controversial matters, including its trigger mecha-
nisms.  This draft included an independent prosecutor, despite a 
large number of states who opposed such a move at that stage in 
the conference.  U.S. delegates expressed outrage at Kirsch’s actions 
and claimed that he had inserted LMG preferences throughout the 
draft that was produced as a result of this meeting—an accurate 
criticism.  
Despite vocal opposition to his leadership, Kirsch continued 
his aggressive approach in ensuring the high-access trigger mecha-
nisms were included in the final draft.  He and the leadership of 
the Committee as a whole kept the drafting process in their own 
hands as the deadline approached for the end of the conference. 
Negotiations had become “increasingly informal and untranspar-
ent” such that no delegate “knew what was going on that last week 
except John Holmes, the Canadian Ambassador, Kirsch, and some 
key leaders of the Like Minded Group,” according to William Pace 
(qtd. in Glasius 55).
Kirsch, and those working with him, wrote up a final draft 
of the Rome Statute that included an independent prosecutor and 
presented it to the delegations on the last day of the Rome Confer-
ence.  With no time left, states were left unable to negotiate this 
or indeed any other provisions at all.  States were presented with 
a “take it or leave it package” that left them with no choice but to 
take it.  
Although 83 percent of states ultimately supported the in-
dependence of the prosecutor, Kirsch’s unilateral actions are an 
important variable in explaining why powerful states, such as the 
members of the Security Council, were unsuccessful in their op-
position.  More importantly, Kirsch’s aggressive leadership strongly 
influenced wavering states to vote for the Independent prosecutor. 
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“Conditions of Uncertainty” and Incomplete Information
A final factor to consider is that the coalition’s success was 
facilitated by small states’ lack of information throughout the nego-
tiation of the Statute.  Many small states did not send delegations 
to the Ad Hoc and PrepCom meetings (Hall 1997, 186).  Further, 
due to translation delays, there was very little time between when 
the final draft of the Statute was sent out and the start of the Rome 
Conference (Bassioun 1999b, 445).The Statute had not received 
significant media attention in many smaller countries, and many 
delegates were unaware of its key provisions (Bassiouni 1999b, 
445).  This was partly because the draft was extremely long—173 
pages, with 1300 different square bracketed proposals—such that 
it was hard to analyze coherently (Bassiouni 1999b, 445).  As a 
result of these factors, when they arrived at Rome, it took these 
delegations two weeks just to learn what the key issues of the Stat-
ute actually were, let alone to determine where they stood on them 
(Bassiouni 1999b, 449).  
Once at Rome, small states faced new practical problems. 
Many delegations were unable to communicate regularly with 
their home capitals as a result of technical inadequacies at Rome, 
including a dearth of fax machines (Bassiouni 1999b, 450-452). 
The building’s layout was, “to say the least, confusing,” and often 
delegates arrived late or not at all for meetings (Bassiouni 1999b, 
450).  Moreover, many of the meetings at Rome lacked translators 
and were conducted only in English (Bassiouni 1998a, 29, fn. 148). 
Consequently, non-English speaking nations were unable to par-
ticipate fully in debates or understand what progress was made.  
The greatest problem small states faced at Rome, however, 
was the sheer number of meetings that were held.  In order to en-
sure each state had a representative at every meeting of the Rome 
Conference, each government would have had to send at least ten 
delegates (Bassiouni 1999b, 450, fn 27).  This number would be 
even higher if one factored in the informal consultations (“infor-
mals” and “informal informals”), of which there were up to 12 a day 
(Bassiouni 1999b, 449).  One-hundred and twelve states out of 163 
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had fewer than 10 delegates.  Of these states, at most 22 ultimately 
rejected the Statute or abstained in the final vote, constituting no 
more than 20 percent of states.14  Over four-fifths of the states 
who could not attend all meetings ultimately voted for the statute. 
In contrast to these states, LMG delegations had sufficient staff to 
attend most meetings.  LMG states had more than 10 delegates on 
average and not only participated in every meeting but were able to 
actively and aggressively pursue their preferences in the absence of 
opposition.  
According to Kofi Annan, for those 112 delegations who 
could not attend all meetings or who were otherwise unable to 
comprehend the progress made on the Statute, NGOs played an 
“unprecedented role” in informing delegations of key issues and ul-
timately persuading them to adopt LMG stances (Annan ix-xi). 
For many delegations, the briefings provided by NGOs were their 
only sources of information on meetings.  In some cases where 
states were short of delegates, NGOs even provided states with 
their own personnel to attend meetings as acting delegates (Pace 
and Thieroff 394).  This presented NGOs with a clear opportunity 
to influence policy—an opportunity they did not pass up (Glasisus 
2006, 43).  
ConClusion
I have sought to address two questions in this paper: why 
states supported the trigger mechanisms as they are formulated, 
and how they were able to incorporate their preferences.  
In a cost-benefit analysis, the primary proponents of the trig-
ger mechanisms, middle powers, had no compelling interest in an 
independent prosecutor or the reduced role of the Security Coun-
14It was probably even less than this number, but since the vote was not disclosed to the 
public, we do not know. We do know that in total 27 states either rejected or abstained 
from the vote, including China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Mexico, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Trinidad, 
Qatar, the USA, and Yemen, who voluntarily made their votes public. This leaves 22 states 
unaccounted for. I am assuming that these states had less than 10 delegates; if they did not, 
the argument would be even stronger in favor of the hypothesis that having less than 10 
delegates led to a positive vote.
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cil.  Nonetheless, while they stood to gain little from the ICC’s 
trigger mechanisms, they would accrue the lowest costs from the 
independent prosecutor, as compared to other states.  If these costs 
had been higher, their support for the independent prosecutor may 
not have been as substantial as it was.  
The evidence indicates that the middle powers’ preferences in 
trigger mechanisms were largely shaped by normative values.  The 
negotiation records clearly demonstrate that delegations from these 
states argued repeatedly and vigorously that the independence of 
the prosecutor and the reduced role for the Security Council were 
essential to effectively bring war criminals to justice, to end human 
suffering, and to foster global peace and security.  It seems prob-
able they preferred these trigger mechanisms precisely because they 
challenged state authority, not in spite of their doing so.  
The middle powers built influential coalitions with other 
states and NGOs in the form of the LMG and the CICC, respec-
tively; its aggressive bargaining tactics, sometimes referred to as “the 
New Diplomacy,” were highly successful in marginalizing the influ-
ence of great powers and aligning the preferences of small states 
with their own.  
As a result, the Rome Statute includes Article 13(c), granting 
the prosecutor the power to take independent action if and when 
states do not.  Although the current prosecutor has yet to investi-
gate a situation of his own will, early indications are that he is not 
afraid to challenge state authority in the face of strong opposition, 
as evidenced by the recent indictment of Hassan Omar Al-Bashir 
in an investigation initiated by the Security Council.  
However, Article 13(c) on its own would not be a major step 
forward to realizing the aims expressed by the middle powers and 
their allies during negotiations without the added authority of Ar-
ticle 17.2, which makes complementarity conditional.  Even if states 
take over investigations initiated by the prosecutor, he may appeal 
such action if states do not conduct investigations and prosecu-
tions at certain standards of impartiality and fairness determined 
by the ICC.  
Amnesty International expressed the perceptual impact of 
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the Rome Statute as follows:
The true significance of the adoption of the Statute may well 
lie, not in the actual institution itself… but in the revolution 
of legal and moral attitudes towards the worst crimes in the 
world.  No longer will these crimes be simply political events 
to be addressed by diplomacy at the international level, but 
crimes which all states have a duty to punish themselves or, 
if they fail to fulfill this duty, by the international community 
in accordance with the rule of law. (qtd. in William Pace and 
Mark Thieroff  396)
The combination of the independent prosecutor and condi-
tional complementarity makes this secondary impact of the ICC a 
significant one.  
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